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This study examined differences in the processing of 
imagery among groups of highly anxious subjects. A 
large group (n = 1,483) of undergraduates was screened 
with questionnaires for social, snake, and dental 
anxiety. From this pool, three sex-balanced groups were 
selected. Each group contained 12 subjects with either: 
(a) high focal anxiety (i.e., dental or snake), (b) high 
social anxiety, or (c) both high focal and social 
anxieties. Subjects imagined various scenes (i.e., 
social anxiety, focal anxiety, physical action, and a 
calm, relaxed state). SignificaPt imagery content 
effects were demonstrated. Anxiety scenes produced 
greater cardiac response than neutral or action scenes. 
Anxiety-relevant scripts were rated as more arousing, 
less pleasant, and produced less dominant feelings than 
non-anxiety scenes. Findings were discussed with regard 
to Lang's bioinformational theory of emotion. 
Affective Response to Imagery: 
Differences between Focal and Social Anxiety 
In recent years, researchers have explored 
differences in imagery processing among diagnostic 
groups within the anxiety disorders, as defined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III-Revised 
(DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987). 
Simple phobia, social phobia, and panic disorder with 
agoraphobia are three classification groups that have 
been extensively studied (e.g., Cook, Melamed, 
Cuthbert, McNeil, & Lang, 1988). Individuals in these 
various diagnostic groups have been found to exhibit 
differences in general verbal report instruments 
reflecting anxiety and depression, and in visceral 
arousal to anxiety imagery. Specifically, Cook et al. 
(1988) reported that physiological reaction to phobic 
imagery is strongest, and is related to questionnaire 
measures of psychopathology and imagery ability, in 
simple phobia. The next strongest visceral response 
amplitudes were in social phobia; the agoraphobia 
diagnosis was associated with the least physiological 
reactivity to phobic imagery. Neither the social 
phobia nor the agoraphobia groups showed concordance 
between visceral response to phobic imagery and verbal 
report measures of anxiety. 
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A variety of studies have contrasted subjects with 
specific (or focal) anxieties (e.g., of snakes, 
spiders, or dentists) with socially anxious subjects, 
whose anxieties are manifested across a variety of 
social situations. In studies comparing public 
speaking anxiety to small animal anxiety, subject 
differences have been found in physiological data, but 
verbal reports to reactions of imagery scenes have been 
inconsistent within and across experiments (Lang, 1977; 
Lang, Levin, Miller, & Kozak, 1983; Lang, Melamed, & 
Hart, 1970). 
Specifically, Lang et al. (1983) contrasted 
individuals anxious about small animals (snakes) with 
social performance (i.e., speech) anxious persons. 
Subjects with so-classified simple (focal) snake 
anxiety demonstrated distinct large amplitude visceral 
responses when imagining anxiety-relevant stimuli. 
Moreover, snake anxious subjects tended to manifest 
physiological patterns during imagery which were 
similar to reactions when anxious subjects either 
anticipate or actually confront an anxiety-provoking 
object. When actually performing a speech, the 
subjects in the social performance anxiety group showed 
significantly greater verbal reports of anxiety and 
arousal than the snake anxiety subjects, but both 
groups exhibited similar increases in physiological 
measures. 
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In another study in which focal anxiety subjects 
were contrasted with social performance anxious 
subjects, the former group reported significantly 
higher vividness ratings to anxiety-relevant imagery 
scenes, and significantly higher ratings of arousal to 
both anxiety-relevant and anxiety-irrelevant scenes 
(Weerts & Lang, 1978). Social performance anxious 
subjects reported no differences in vividness ratings 
between anxiety-relevant and anxiety-irrelevant scenes. 
While both groups demonstrated increases in heart rate 
and skin conductance to anxiety-relevant scenes, the 
mean scores for anxiety-relevant scenes were higher in 
the focal anxiety group than for the social performance 
anxiety group. 
Less consistent physiological patterns have been 
shown in socially anxious individuals across various 
contexts (e.g., in vivo exposure, imagery) of anxiety 
arousal (Lang et al., 1983). Socially anxious subjects 
appear less responsive to emotional imagery and seem to 
have larger discrepancies between reported arousal and 
actual physiological reactivity than persons with focal 
anxiety (Lang et al., 1970). Identifying socially 
anxious subjects on the basis of public speaking 
anxiety may account for some of the discrepancies 
reported in the literature. Research by McNeil and 
Lewin (1986; 1990) seriously questions the assumption 
that speech anxious persons are broadly representative 
of social anxiety. 
Anxiety Combinations 
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While several studies have examined individuals 
with either social or focal anxiety, few researchers 
have explored the area of anxiety combinations. One 
study examined focal (dental) and speech anxiety, and 
added a third subject group: subjects with both dental 
and speech anxiety (McNeil, Vrana, Melamed, Cuthbert, & 
Lang, 1990; McNeil, Vrana, Melamed, & Lang, 1985). 
Individuals with combinations of high and low dental 
and speech anxiety constituted the groups. Speech 
anxious individuals responded with increases in cardiac 
activity only to imagery of social situations. All 
subjects rated anxiety scenes that were relevant to 
their particular anxiety as more unpleasant and 
arousing. Dental anxious individuals, however, 
demonstrated heart rate increases on all anxiety and 
action-oriented scenes. Subjects with both speech and 
dental anxiety exhibited the highest level of 
physiological arousal. These results suggested 
possible additive effects in physiological reactivity 
vis-a-vis the number of anxiety-provoking stimuli 
affecting a person. 
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Researchers (e.g., Bernstein & Knapp, 1981; Kraft 
& Al-Issa, 1965; Stevenson & Hain, 1967) have 
identified individuals with multiple simple phobias. 
There seem to be two types of multiple phobias. In the 
first group, subjects have many anxieties which are 
generalized from a specific set of stimuli around which 
activating cues are loosely organized. For example, 
Kraft and Al-Issa (1965) described a man who was 
involved in a highway accident. He developed phobias 
to motorcycles, sounds which approximated the squeal of 
brakes, and being near or on a roadway. In the second 
group, however, individuals seem to have several 
independent phobias (Bernstein & Knapp, 1981; Liberman 
& Smith, 1972; Van Hassett, Hersen, Bellack, Rosenblum, 
& Lamparski, 1979). Multiple phobias do not seem to be 
the result of generalization in this case, but seem to 
represent the existence of several distinct and 
separate anxieties (e.g., anxieties of blood, heights, 
and academic examinations). 
One study attempted to identify the incidence of 
nongeneralized, multiple anxieties in a college 
population. Fritz, Ugarte, and McNeil (1986) defined 
individuals who scored within the top 10% of their 
same-gender distribution on Fear Survey Schedule-III 
subscales as highly anxious. The subscales used were 
defined by Wolpe and Lang's (1964) face valid 
classifications of anxiety (i.e., tissue damage, 
social, small animals, classical). Approximately 10% 
of a large undergraduate population were found to be 
concurrently highly anxious in two or more content 
areas. The results of this study emphasi2e the 
importance of examining a population (i.e., persons 
with multiple anxieties) which has, until recently, 
been largely ignored, but may represent a substantial 
proportion of anxious individuals. Some researchers 
have furthered this area of study by attempting to 
develop a standard methodology to determine whether or 




Propositional network theory offers one 
explanation for the research findings already presented 
here. According to propositional theories, small, 
independent units of knowledge (i.e., propositions) are 
infinitely interconnected in a network pattern. For 
each individual, specific information is stored 
pertaining to context, semantic meaning and action. 
(For additional discussion regarding propositional 
network theory, refer to Appendix A.) Different 
anxiety disorders may vary systematically with respect 
to the organization of the networks that underlie the 
psychopathology (Cook et al., 1988; Lang, 1985; Lang & 
Cuthbert, 1984). 
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For simple phobics, the anxiety network and its 
available information is thought to be a highly 
integrated memory representation that relates to the 
anxiety-provoking stimuli. Simple phobics typically 
have little contact with specific anxiety-provoking 
objects and/or situations; therefore, the anxiety 
network has little chance to be modified in the natural 
environment. Socially anxious individuals continually 
encounter social stimuli, so anxiety memories are 
modified on an ongoing basis. Consequently, the cues 
that activate the network are more varied and less 
coherent. In panic disorder with agoraphobia, the 
information in the anxiety network is much less 
specific. The stimuli which provide cues for 
agoraphobia are varied and vague, leading to a 
generalized anxiety response to a variety of seemingly 
unrelated stimuli (Lang, 1985). 
Simple phobics seem to utilize avoidance to reduce 
anxiety from phobic stimuli, social phobics become 
hypervigilant of the environment, and individuals with 
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agoraphobia have a less context-bound response (Cook et 
al., 1988). Moreover, Turner, McCann, Beidel, and 
Mezzich (1986) reported that the anxieties of simple 
and social phobics, agoraphobics, generalized anxiety 
subjects, and obsessive-compulsive disorder clients 
were quantitatively different. Simple phobics reported 
the least number of anxieties on the Fear Survey 
Schedule-!, followed by social phobics, obsessive-
compulsives, and agoraphobics. These latter results 
suggest that differences exist not only in information 
processing, but also in the content of and/or number of 
anxieties. 
Due to differences in information processing and 
behavioral symptomatology of various anxieties, a 
continuum of anxiety disorders with respect to the 
degree of cognitive organization and reactivity to 
emotional stimuli has been proposed to exist. Simple 
phobia represents the highest level of organization and 
responsiveness, followed by social phobia, with 
agoraphobia at the other extreme (Lang, 1985; Lang & 
Cuthbert, 1984); other anxiety disorders are also 
proposed as falling along this continuum at various 
points. 
Lang and Cuthbert (1984) expounded upon the 
concept of a continuum of anxiety disorders. 
The continuum is defined by the degree to 
which arousing, negatively valent responses 
(and perhaps also disruption of control) are 
linked associatively to coherent affect 
networks or, viewed from the other direction, 
the degree to which these affective response 
dispositions float in memory and are prompted 
by many stimuli, transferring their 
excitation to a great variety of other memory 
structures (Lang & Cuthbert, 1984, p. 386). 
With respect to social phobic and agoraphobic 
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individuals, the stimuli and settings which define and 
determine levels of distress are variable. Simple 
phobics, however, have a highly defined set of stimuli 
which evoke reactions. (For additional discussion of 
Lang's bioinformational theory of emotion as it relates 
to diagnostic groups, refer to Appendix A.) 
Statement of the Problem 
The present study was designed to examine imagery 
response differences among focal, social and 
social/focal anxious individuals. This experiment was 
a replication and extension of work conducted by McNeil 
et al. (1985, 1990). Focal anxiety subjects were 
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selected to represent the major categories of simple 
anxieties, chosen on the basis of reports of common 
anxieties (Agras, Sylvester, & Oliveau, 1969), and 
previous factor analytic research (Holmes, Rothstein, 
Stout, & Rosencrans, 1975; Landy & Gaupp, 1971; Meikle 
& Mitchell, 1974; Rubin, Katkin, Weiss, & Efran, 1968). 
The anxieties selected represent factors which 
repeatedly account for large percentages of variance in 
factor analytic research (Kaloupek, Peterson, & Lewis, 
1981) and which correspond to Wolpe and Lang's (1969) 
face valid classifications of anxiety contents. Snake 
and dental anxiety were chosen to represent individuals 
who have simple (i.e., specific or focal) anxiety. 
Social anxiety represents one of Wolpe and Lang's 
(1964) major categories of anxiety content. In this 
study, generally socially anxious individuals 
constituted a second group. DSM-III-R (1987) 
recognizes social phobia as separate and distinct from 
simple phobia. Several studies have provided evidence 
to support this distinction (e.g., Marks, 1987). 
A third group of subjects with both social and 
focal anxieties was selected for comparison purposes. 
The nature of their underlying anxiety structure is as 
yet undetermined. These individuals may have both a 
coherent anxiety network organized around a specific 
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anxiety, as well as a less coherent network organized 
around social anxiety. The inclusion of this 
combination anxiety group is imperative in determining 
additive or interactive effects of various types of 
anxiety information that may be coded into memory in 
distinct ways. 
An imagery assessment procedure which has been 
utilized frequently in anxiety research (e.g., Lang et 
al., 1980; McNeil et al., 1985, 1990) tested 
differences between groups. Cardiac data were measured 
before, during, and after imagery trials. 
Audiorecorded scripts served as imagery prompts. 
Several scene categories (i.e., neutral, action, social 
anxiety, and focal anxiety) were employed as stimuli. 
Script contents were designed to contain both stimulus 
and response propositions. Research has demonstrated 
the importance of stimulus information in evoking 
reactions (Lang et al., 1980), and response data to 
encourage somatovisceral involvement in imagery (Lang, 
1985). With such imagery prompts, subjects can 
reliably demonstrate affective response, paralleling 
reaction achieved in actual involvement of stimuli. 
Individuals with strong coherent affective networks 
(i.e., focal anxiety) are likely to demonstrate imagery 
activation which elicits increased physiological 
responses (e.g., more rapid heart rate). 
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Although nonclinical individuals were selected as 
subjects, researchers (e.g., Borkovec & Rachman, 1979; 
Kazdin, 1978) have emphasized the continuity between 
clinical patients and so-called "analogue" populations. 
Moreover, recent research (McNeil et al., 1990) has 
provided empirical demonstration of the similarity 
between highly anxious nonclinic undergraduates and 
clinic patients with anxiety disorders. There can be 
differences among clinic and nonclinic populations 
related to the intensity of anxiety, but neither the 
content nor the topography of expression of anxiety 
(e.g., physiological arousal, reports of distress, and 
avoidance) have been reliably demonstrated to be 
different between clinical and nonclinical individuals. 
Therefore, highly anxious, but nonclinical, individuals 
participated in this study. 
Hypotheses 
Verbal report. It was predicted that each group 
would obtain highest scores on their most anxiety-
relevant instruments. Therefore, the focal group was 
expected to obtain highest scores on the SNAQ and DFS; 
higher scores on the SADS were predicted for the social 
group. (These instruments were used to select these 
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subjects.) Because the focal/social group consisted of 
subjects with combinations of anxieties, this group was 
expected to report high levels of both focal and social 
anxiety. Again, these differences would be primarily 
related to the method of subject selection. As public 
speaking appears to be a distinct, but important factor 
in social anxiety (McNeil & Lewin, 1986, 1990), it was 
anticipated that the focal/social and social groups 
would report levels of public speaking anxiety which 
would be higher than the focal group's scores. 
Regarding general measures of anxiety, the focal/social 
anxiety group was expected to report the highest levels 
of anxiety, followed by the social group and then the 
focal group. Additionally, the focal group was 
expected to manifest better self-reported imagery 
ability than the other groups. 
Free recall. It was hypothesized that the focal 
subjects would demonstrate greatest recall of imagery 
script information, as their anxiety-provoking stimuli 
are distinct and well-defined. Social and focal/social 
anxiety subjects were predicted to recall less script 
information, due to a less defined network of anxiety 
cues. 
Cardiac response. Due to the hypothesized 
extensive anxiety networking which contains 
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propositions regarding both social and focal stimuli, 
the focal/social group was expected to demonstrate a 
higher level of physiological reactivity to all anxiety 
scenes than either the social or focal anxiety groups. 
Heart rate for all groups was predicted to be greater 
for anxiety imagery scenes than action or neutral 
scenes. 
Affective judaments. Anxiety-provoking scenes 
were predicted to be rated as less positive than 
neutral and action scenes. It was anticipated that 
subjects would rate anxiety-relevant scenes more 
unpleasant than nonanxiety-relevant scenes (e.g., 
socially anxious subjects would rate social scenes more 
negatively than snake scenes). Anxiety-evoking scenes 
were expected to produce more reports of arousal than 
nonanxious scenes. Subjects were also predicted to 
report highest levels of arousal to their anxiety-
relevant scripts (e.g., focal subjects were anticipated 
to judge snake and dental scenes as more arousing than 
social scenes). Hypotheses concerning dominance were 
comparable to those pertaining to valence judgments, in 
that subjects were predicted to report feeling more in 
control during action and neutral scenes, and less in 
control during anxiety scenes. Groups were expected to 
report least control during their anxiety-relevant 
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scenes. It was expected that the focal anxiety qroup 
would report qreater vividness in imaqined anxiety 
scenes, relative to the other two qroups, as their 
coqnitive networks reqardinq anxiety-producinq stimuli 
are presumed to be more coherent and accessible. 
Neutral scenes were expected to be rated as more vivid 
than other scenes. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 36 underqraduate volunteers at 
Oklahoma State University who received extra class 
credit for their participation in this study. These 
subjects were selected from a pool <n = 1,483) of 
introductory psycholoqy students who were screened with 
anxiety questionnaires. Subjects who scored hiqh on 
reported anxieties on one or more of these 
questionnaires (i.e., top 15% of their same-qender 
distribution) were eliqible for participation. Scores 
on questionnaires that were not relevant to 
participants' primary anxiety (or anxieties) varied 
randomly. The three qroups, which were balanced by 
gender and number, were: (a) individuals with hiqh 
levels of focal (dental or snake) anxiety, (b) 
. 
individuals with high social anxiety, and (c) 
individuals with high levels of both social and a focal 
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anxiety. There were equal numbers of dental and snake 
anxious individuals in the focal anxiety and the 
focal/social anxiety groups. All subjects were 
Caucasian with the exception of one Black female. 
Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 37 years old. 
Mean ages of groups were as follows: focal anxiety 
group (M = 18.8, SD = 0.7), social anxiety group (M = 
20.4, SD = 5.0), and focal/social anxieties group (M = 
20.4, SD = 4.2). The ages of the groups did not differ 
(f(2, 33) = .68, ~ > .10). One individual was excluded 
from the study and replaced since it was reported that 
a cardiovascular abnormality was present. 
Materials 
Dental anxiety was assessed with the Dental Fear 
Survey (DFS; Kleinknecht, Klepac, & Alexander, 1973). 
Snake anxiety was evaluated with the Snake Fear 
Questionnaire (SNAQ; Lang, Melamed, & Hart, 1970). 
Frequently, in the past, socially anxious individuals 
have been identified through public speaking anxiety 
questionnaires (e.g., Weerts & Lang, 1978). However, 
recent research suggests that circumscribed speech 
anxious individuals represent a distinct subtype of 
social anxiety (McNeil & Lewin, 1986, 1990). To ensure 
identification of generalized social anxiety, the 
Social Anxiety & Distress Scale (SADS; Watson & Friend, 
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1969) was utilized. Subjects who participated in a 
laboratory session subsequent to the screeninq also 
completed the followinq verbal report instruments: a 
public speakinq anxiety questionnaire, the Personal 
Report of Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966); 
the Fear Survey Schedule-III (FSS-III; Wolpe & Lanq, 
1964, 1969); and the Fenz-Epstein Anxiety Questionnaire 
(FEQ; Fenz & Epstein, 1965). The Questionnaire upon 
Mental Imaqery (QMI; Sheehan, 1967; shortened version 
of Bett's 1909 Questionnaire upon Mental Imaqery; 
reprinted in Richardson, 1969) was also included 
because it has been found that imaqery ability, as an 
individual difference factor, can influence 
physioloqical response, in that good imagers are better 
able to produce physioloqical responsivity to prompted 
imaqery than poor imaqers (e.q., Miller, Levin, Kozak, 
Cook, McLean, & Lanq, 1987). 
Apparatus 
Physioloqical data were collected on-line by an 
IBM PC/XT with a Scientific Solutions LabMaster 
interface board. This board includes a proqrammable 
clock and was used as a controller for automated 
laboratory procedures, such as the presentation of 
rating fiqures for recordinq subjects' affective 
judgments reqarding imaqery trials. Virtual Processing 
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Machine (VPM) software (Cook, Atkinson, & Lang, 1987) 
served to direct stimulus presentation and data 
acquisition. Physiological activity was monitored 
using computer-interfaced Coulbourn Instruments (CI) 
modulesi a CI 575-01 High Gain Bioamplifier/Coupler was 
used for cardiac data. Lead I electrocardiagram (EKG) 
was obtained from standard Beckman 16rnm silver-silver 
chloride electrodes attached to the ventral surface of 
the right and left forearms. A Schmitt trigger 
apparatus (CI Bipolar Comparator, 521-06, and a CI 
Retriggerable One Shot, 552-12) were used to detect 
cardiac R waves and then to signal the computer to 
record interbeat intervals. 
The laboratory included a subject room and an 
adjacent control/equipment room. Prerecorded imagery 
scripts were presented using an audiocassette player 
and a small speaker in the subject room. Periodic 
observation of the subject was possible by a one-way 
mirror between roomsi an intercom system was also 
available for communication between experimenter and 
subject. 
The subjects operated a potentiometer with their 
dominant hand to make ratings regarding the experience 
of each imagery script. Lang's (1980) computer graphic 
display of an abstract Self Assessment Mannequin (SAM) 
was used to record affective judgments. Subjects 
assessed three dimensions, chosen on the basis of 
research on verbal report of emotion. Russell and 
Mehrabian (1974, 1977) found that verbal report of 
experience of emotion could be understood using three 
factors: Valence, Arousal, and Dominance. The three 
dimensions (rated Qn 0 to 20 point scales) were: 
Valence (i.e., happy-sad), Arousal (i.e., aroused-
calm), and Dominance (i.e., in control-being 
controlled). Additionally, a rating of imagery 
vividness (vivid-not vivid) was included. 
Procedure 
Laboratory Session. Subjects who met specified 
criteria on screening instruments were invited to the 
laboratory to participate in an additional assessment 
procedure. Following an explanation of the general 
purpose of the study and the methodology employed, 
subjects signed a -consent form. A tour of the 
laboratory followed. Then, questionnaire 
administration was conducted, including 
readministration of the three screening instruments. 
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After questionnaires, participants were seated in 
an overstuffed reclining chair in the subject room for 
an imagery assessment procedure in which physiological 
and verbal responses to eleven standard audio scripts 
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were recorded. Electrodes were attached, and the 
resulting signal was tested for adequacy. The Self 
Assessment Mannequin rating procedure (Lang, 1980) was 
demonstrated once and then practiced once by the 
subjeqt. Rating figures were presented between imagery 
trials via a video monitor which faced the participant. 
The subject's chair was partially reclined, and the 
lights dimmed. Other than rating affective experiences 
following each imagery trial, subjects were instructed 
to keep their eyes closed. Audiotaped relaxation 
instructions were first presented to subjects. A three 
minute baseline was then conducted to assess the 
initial cardiac activity level. The eleven scripts 
were then presented. 
Script contents. The first trial was of neutral 
content (i.e., waiting at a bus stop) and was used to 
habituate subjects to the imagery procedure; data from 
this trial were not analyzed. A total of five · 
different content areas were represented in the 
scripts: (a) social anxiety, (b) dental (focal) 
anxiety, (c) snake (focal) anxiety, (d) action, and (e) 
neutral. All of the anxiety and action scripts 
contained physiologically-arousing response 
propositions. Two scenes pertained to social anxiety 
(i.e., experiencing disapproval and criticism from an 
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authority figure, presenting a speech). In order to 
assess focal anxieties, two scripts related to each 
specific anxiety. There were scripts for both dental 
anxiety (i.e., sitting in a dental chair experiencing a 
dental injection, anticipating a dental examination) 
and snake anxiety (i.e., spotting a snake swimming in 
front of a boat, seeing a snake while walking in an 
open field). Action scenes were also presented. These 
scripts contained response propositions, but lacked 
affective references (i.e., riding a bicycle, flying a 
kite). There were two additional neutral scripts that 
contained neither response propositions nor affective 
references (i.e., sitting in a lawn chair, sitting in a 
living room). All subjects were presented with all 11 
scripts. The scripts are presented in Appendix B. 
Order of script presentation. Initially, a 
neutral scene (i.e., waiting at a bus stop) was 
presented to the subject as a practice trial. Then, 
during the first of two blocks of five trials, one 
script from each of the five content areas was 
nonsystematically chosen for presentation in the order 
ABCDE. The remaining scripts from each content 
category were then presented in the order DCEBA in the 
second block of five trials to avoid consecutive 
presentation of two trials from the same category. 
Action and neutral scenes were arranged as to avoid a 
grouping of anxiety scenes. Within the above 
specifications the order of presentation was 
nonsystematic, and unique for all subjects. 
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Imagery trial stages. Physiological data were 
collected over four stages: (a) 30 second "Baseline" 
preceding each script presentation, (b) 30-50 second 
"Read" period during which the script was presented 
(only the last 30 seconds of data from this period were 
collected to minimize variance due to differences in 
script length), {c) 30 second "Image" period in which 
subjects imagined the scene, and (d) 30 second 
"Recover" period in which individuals were instructed 
to stop imagining the scene and to relax. A one second 
1000 Hz tone was presented immediately prior to the 
"Recovery" period to indicate to the subject to stop 
imaging, and to relax. At the end of the Recovery 
period, another similar tone sounded, to cue the 
subject to open his or her eyes. At this time, 
subjects evaluated their imagery experience using the 
SAM figures and vividness scale. Following the 
ratings, subjects were instructed to close their eyes 
and prepare for the next trial. Intertrial intervals 
randomly varied in duration, but were at least 10 
seconds long. Subsequent to the imagery trials, 
subjects were asked to freely recall information from 
each script, using a prepared form. 
Results 
Data Processing and Reduction 
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For every trial, histograms were constructed for 
cardiac interbeat intervals across each measurement 
period (i.e., Baseline, Read, Image, Recover). From 
each histogram, the median value was selected. Median 
cardiac periods were converted to beats-per-minute. 
Change scores were calculated for cardiac data by 
subtracting the Baseline value from the subsequent 
Read, Image, and Recover scores for each trial. This 
procedure reduced between-subjects variance due to 
initial physiological differences and changes over the 
course of imagery trials. 
Data from the Read and Image periods were combined 
to simplify analysis. Recovery data were not analyzed, 
consistent with past research (Cook et al., 1988). 
Medians from each of the two scenes in each content 
area were averaged together for analyses. In the 
imagery free recall task, total number of scripts 
recalled and number of words reported in recollections 
constituted the dependent variables. 
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Statistical Analyses 
Separate one-way univariate analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) across the three groups were initially 
calculated for dependent measures. Significant ANOVAs 
were followed by Duncan Multiple Range Tests at the .OS 
criterion level to identify specific differences 
between groups. This process was employed for all 
dependent measures, including questionnaires, imagery 
ratings, cardiac data, and free recall data. 
Verbal Report Instruments 
Table 1 presents group data from questionnaires, 
along with the results from univariate ANOVAs and 
Duncan Multiple Range Tests. Selection of subjects on 
Insert Table 1 about here 
the basis of verbal report assessment measures was 
successful. Group means were highest on anxiety-
relevant questionnaires; both focal and focal/social 
group scores on the DFS and SNAQ were significantly 
higher than the social subjects' scores. Scores on 
social anxiety measures (SADS, PRCS) were highest for 
the social and focal/social groups and differed 
significantly from the focal group. Hypotheses 
regarding general measures of anxiety were mostly 
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supported. On the FEQ-Insecurity and the FEQ-Arousal 
scales, the social anxiety group and the focal/social 
anxiety group had significantly higher scores than the 
focal anxiety group, but did not differ from each 
other. On the FSS-III, the focal and social anxiety 
groups had significantly lower scores than the 
focal/social anxiety group. Differences on the FEQ-
Muscle Tension scale were not significant among 
groups. The hypothesis that focal anxiety subjects 
would report better imagery ability on the QMI than 
either the social or focal/social groups was not 
supported, as no differences were demonstrated among 
groups. 
Free Recall Data 
The hypothesis that individuals with one focal 
anxiety would recall more scenes and particular script 
words than the social and the focal/social groups was 
not supported (Total Scripts: E(2, 33) = .14, R >.10; 
Total Words recalled: E(2, 33) = .41, R >.10). Table 
2 outlines group means for the free recall data. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Baseline Physiology 
An ANOVA on data from the initial three minute 
baseline period revealed no significant differences 
among groups (f(2, 33) = .51, R >.10) in heart rate. 
Means for the three groups were as follows: focal 
anxiety group (M = 67.3, SD = 8.6), social anxiety 
group (M = 70.5, SD = 7.7), and focal/social anxiety 
group (M = 69.7, SD = 8.3). 
Cardiac Responsivity 
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A significant content effect was noted (f(4, 132) 
= 6.06, R <.001). Duncan's Tests indicated that two 
anxiety contents (i.e., social and snake) produced 
significantly more physiological arousal than either 
the action or neutral scripts. There were no 
differences in cardiac response among the anxiety-
provoking scenes, nor were there significant 
differences in heart rate between the action and 
neutral scene contents. The dental scenes differed 
only from the neutral content. Figure 1 illustrates 
cardiac response (i.e., heart rate changes from 
baseline) to the five scene contents. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------
• 
An analysis of variance revealed neither significant 
group by content interaction (f(8, 132) = 1.35, ~ 
>.10), nor group (f(2, 33) = 1.55, ~ >.10) effects. 
Affective Judgments 
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Valence. Significant effects were produced from 
the group by content interaction (f{8, 132) = 2.5, ~ 
<.01) on ratings of valence. Duncans' Tests indicated 
that the social group rated the snake content more 
positively than did the focal group. Neutral and 
action scenes were rated more positively than the three 
anxiety contents. Of the anxiety-provoking contents, 
dental and social scenes were rated as significantly 
less pleasant than the snake scene content. Figure 2 
illustrates group valence ratings for each content. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Arousal. The hypothesis regarding differences 
among ratings of scene contents was supported (f(4, 
132) = 89.01, ~ <.0001). Anxiety scenes were rated as 
more arousing than the action and neutral scripts; the 
action content had a higher arousal rating than the 
neutral content. The group by content interaction was 
not significant (f(S, 132) = 1.79, ~ >.10). There were 
no significant differences in ratings of arousal among 
the three groups (f(2, 33) = .74, ~ >.10). Figure 3 
presents group arousal ratings. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
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Dominance. As with arousal judgments, differences 
among ratings of contents were significant (f(4, 132) = 
54.41, ~ <.0001). Further examination with Duncans' 
tests demonstrated that subjects reported feeling more 
in control during the neutral and action scenes than 
during the anxiety-provoking scenes. Among the anxiety 
scenes, subjects reported highest dominance during the 
snake scenes, followed by social and dental scripts, 
the latter two differing significantly from the snake 
scenes. Group by content interaction effects were not 
found (f(8, 132) = .58,~ >.10). Differences in 
reported dominance feelings among groups were not 
demonstrated (f(2, 33) = .59,~ >.10). Figure 4 
illustrates group dominance ratings for all contents. 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Vividness. Vividness ratings differed 
significantly (f(4, 132) = 5.42, Q <.005) with respect 
to content. Subjects rated dental and neutral scenes 
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as significantly more vivid than action, snake and 
social scenes. Figure 5 illustrates these findings. 
The hypothesis that the focal group would best be able 
to imagine anxiety-relevant scripts was not supported 
(Groups: f(2, 33) = 1.83, ~ >.10). 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine possible 
variations in affective response among three groups of 
highly anxious subjects, within the context of Lang's 
(e.g., Lang, 1985) bioinformational theory of emotion. 
Based on previous research (McNeil et al., 1985, 1990), 
a possible additive nature of anxiety was suspected, in 
that individuals with two distinct anxieties were 
expected to react more strongly to imagery in ?oth 
verbal reports and physiological reactivity than 
subjects with only one focal or social anxiety. These 
results were expected due to hypothesized differences 
in the extent and level of organization in cognitive 
networks underlying the subjects' anxieties. However, 
the data obtained did not demonstrate consistent 
significant differences among groups on either cardiac 
responsivity or affective judgments. Nevertheless, 
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these data replicated previous findings that subjects' 
cardiac response to anxiety-evoking imagery was greater 
than that to control imagery (e.g., Lang et al., 1980, 
1983). 
The lack of support for the major question was 
surprising in that the paradigm employed has been 
utilized frequently with success (e.g., Lang et al., 
1983; McNeil et al., 1985, 1990). It may be that the 
more relaxed criteria (i.e., top 15% of the 
distribution) in this study may have identified less 
anxious subjects than found using more restrictive 
criteria (i.e., top 6% of the distribution) in previous 
research (McNeil et al., 1985, 1990). Other subject 
selection procedures were also examined. Initially, 
subjects were sought who reported high levels of 
anxiety (i.e., top 15%) in one area (e.g., dental) and 
low levels of anxiety (i.e., bottom 10%) in other 
examined areas (e.g., snake and social). Subject 
selection using this criterion was difficult for two 
reasons. 
First, individuals who obtained the highest scores 
on verbal report measures, and who were within the top 
percentage of their same gender distribution, were 
excluded from the study, as these persons demonstrated 
a multiplicity of anxiety, with all questionnaire 
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scores elevated. In effect, the most anxious subjects, 
and potentially those most likely to exhibit strong 
physiological reactivity, were excluded from 
participation, as they violated selection criteria of 
significant (i.e., top 15% of the distribution) anxiety 
in only one or two of the three areas measured (i.e., 
dental, snake, social anxieties). As a result of the 
higher than expected levels of anxiety manifested 
across verbal report measures, the original criteria 
were altered, such that subjects were chosen who 
reported high levels of anxiety in one area, with the 
other scales allowed to vary randomly. Of the 36 
participating subjects, 25 met the original selection 
criteria. 
Secondly, the process of subject selection 
revealed that of the individuals who met criteria for 
participation, a small percentage later reported 
significant levels of anxiety to other measured stimuli 
on objective measures. For example, during the initial 
group screening, an individual might score highly on 
only one questionnaire (e.g., dental) and therefore, be 
identified as a dental subject. However, during the 
second administration of verbal report instruments 
prior to the experimental procedure, a high level of 
social anxiety, in addition to the original dental 
anxiety, might be reported, thus creating a sample of 
anxious subjects who were actually more similar than 
distinct. There were five subjects exhibited this 
pattern. 
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Consequently, there was difficulty in locating 
individuals with distinct anxieties, and therefore, the 
groups may have been more homogeneous than originally 
intended. This issue presents an interesting paradox 
in that one of the goals of this research project was 
to identify and examine subjects with multiple 
anxieties, yet the results suggest that the presence of 
individuals with several anxieties is greater than what 
was expected; that is, subjects with single, well-
defined anxieties were less prevalent than anticipated. 
Although this study was unable to demonstrate 
additive effects of multiple simple anxieties, other 
researchers have explored whether or not anxieties 
summate (Rachman & Lopatka, 1986a). These researchers 
chose subjects who were anxious about spiders, snakes, 
or both spiders and snakes. Behavioral approach tasks 
were administered; subjects predicted levels of anxiety 
before exposure, and then rated actual levels of 
anxiety during exposure. Subjects who were anxious 
about only one animal reported less anxiety than 
subjects anxious of both animals. Among the group with 
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two anxieties, level of anxiety regarding either a 
spider or snake did not significantly differ. However, 
in the subjects with two anxieties, when the second 
stimulus presented was reported to be more anxiety-
provoking than the first, an increase in anxiety was 
recorded over the tasks. When the first stimulus 
produced greater anxiety than the second, a decrease in 
anxiety was noted over the tasks. When both stimuli 
were rated equally anxiety-provoking, a decrease was 
reported. Rachman and Lopatka (1986a) concluded that 
anxiety-provoking stimuli with similar attributes 
produce a summation in experienced anxiety. If the 
anxiety-provoking stimuli are different with respect to 
relevant attributes, then additive effects do not 
occur. Unrelated anxieties should have no summation 
effects. What may be occurring is a contrast effect, 
in that the product of two anxiety-producing stimuli is 
determined by order and intensity of earlier 
presentations, with a descending order of intensity 
resulting in a decrease in anxiety, while ascending 
order of intensity leads to a summation. Therefore, 
the first stimulus functions as a point of reference 
for the second stimulus. Perhaps in the present 
multiple anxiety study, a contrast, rather than a 
summation effect occurred, due to the difference in 
attributes of the anxiety contents. The lack of 
relatedness between dental and snake anxieties in the 
focal/social group may have led to such a contrast 
effect. 
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It is also possible that the lack of differences 
in this study may be due to the different method of 
selecting multiple anxiety subjects (i.e., general 
social anxiety and dental or snake anxiety) versus that 
of prior research (McNeil et al., 1985, 1990) in which 
speech anxiety was selected as a combination with 
dental anxiety. Finally, these null findings may be 
due to a lack of statistical power. 
Regarding imagery, difficulties may have existed 
in the ability to access and activate the subjects' 
cognitive networks, resulting in attenuated 
physiological responses and subjective judgments of 
experimental scripts. The elements that constitute a 
stable anxiety prototype (i.e., stimulus, response, and 
meaning) may have been differentially and 
insufficiently activated. Although images are recalled 
in an inexact, approximal manner, the media prompts 
used may not have adequately matched the subjects' 
anxiety prototype in long term memory, and may have 
been unable to activate the network. A mismatching of 
anxiety prototypes may have resulted from the use of 
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standard, rather than personally-relevant scripts. 
Therefore, subjects whose social anxiety was primarily 
manifested in encounters with the opposite gender may 
not have been affected by scenes in which public 
speaking was described. Additionally, as the breadth 
of anxiety in the subjects was higher than originally 
thought (i.e., few subjects reported only one area of 
distinct anxiety), the affective networks may not have 
been well-defined. The anxiety-provoking stimuli may 
have been poorly matched to the anxiety prototype in 
memory, with many diffuse activating cues, failing to 
evoke strong physiological responses. 
Furthermore, the subjects' ability to process 
images determines the degree to which the anxiety 
prototype is accessed. In this study, fatigue may have 
impeded access to the affective networks. The 
procedure required two to four continuous hours of the 
subjects' time, depending on the speed of questionnaire 
completion. Several subjects remarked during the 
debriefing they became tired, and were less motivated 
to imagine or consider each script fully for affective 
judgments. Many subjects developed a pattern of 
judging arousal, dominance, and valence in a polarized 
fashion, so that subtle variations, which might have 
been meaningful across groups, may have been obscured. 
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Questionnaire Data 
General predictions for group responses to 
questionnaires were supported. Some of the results 
from questionnaires supported the notion of a continuum 
of anxiety, such that greater reports of anxiety were 
found for those individuals with multiple anxieties. 
The results of the FSS-III demonstrated higher levels 
of reported anxiety in the focal/social group than 
other groups. The FEQ-Insecurity and FEQ-Autonomic 
Arousal scales demonstrated less anxiety in the focal 
anxiety group than the other two groups. With respect 
to the PRCS, the focal group reported less anxiety than 
the other two groups as well. 
Free Recall 
The lack of findings supporting the hypothesis of 
group differences with respect to free recall of script 
information may have been due to inexact methodology. 
Total number of scripts recalled, as well as number of 
words reported in recollections, constituted the data 
for analysis. Differential recall of anxiety-relevant 
scripts was expected. For focal subjects, who have 
distinct anxiety-evoking stimuli on which to focus, 
greater ability to recall significant details of 
anxiety-relevant scripts was expected. Some subjects 
reproduced scripts verbatim; others recollected only 
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elements perceived to be essential (e.g., nouns, verbs, 
adjectives). Variations in material recalled reflect 
not only the ability to access successfully the anxiety 
network, but also idiosyncratic styles of recall. 
These two factors created difficulties in 
differentiating sources of variance. 
Cardiac Responsivity 
Differences among groups with respect to cardiac 
reactivity to anxiety-relevant stimuli were not found. 
This finding is in contrast to general findings in the 
area of imagery and psychophysiology in which 
differences in heart rate between groups of anxious 
subjects have been reported (e.g., Cook et al., 1988; 
McNeil et al., 1985, 1990). As already noted, the lack 
of findings may have been due to a variety of factors, 
such as subject selection. 
To accentuate group differences, response 
training, such as that described by Lang et al. (1983) 
might be utilized in future research. In this imagery 
training procedure, subjects are reinforced for the 
verbal report of somatic responses to imagery. This 
procedure enhances differentiated visceral response 
during anxiety imagery. Moreover, subjects who are 
response trained produce patterns of cardiac 
responsivity during imagery that parallel the results 
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for physiological response demonstrated to the actual 
anxiety-provoking stimuli (e.g., a live snake). Lang 
et al. (1983) also reported that trained subjects 
exhibited greater concordance between verbal report and 
visceral measures than untrained persons. 
Affective Judgments 
Neutral and action scenes did not differ from each 
other, but were rated as more positive, less arousing, 
and produced more of a sense of control in subjects 
than anxiety scripts. This finding is consistent with 
previous research (e.g., Marks, Marset, Boulougouris, & 
Huson, 1971). Within the anxiety contents, the snake 
content produced unique results. The snake scenes were 
rated less negatively than the dental and social scenes 
and subjects reported they felt more control in these 
scenes. It may be that the snake scenes were less 
anxiety-provoking in their content. However, these 
results may also stem from individuals' ability to 
avoid snakes adequately, while social encounters occur 
daily and are difficult to avoid or escape entirely. 
With respect to the dental scenes, although individuals 
can avoid dental care to some extent, unless they are 




Although this study was unable to produce evidence 
suggesting that multiple anxieties yield additive 
effects with respect to physiological reactivity and 
reported distress, the concept of multiple anxieties 
remains intriguing. As the research paradigm employed 
is well established (e.g., Lang et al., 1983), future 
research may require extra caution in subject 
selection. In order to assess the independence of 
anxieties more fully, procedures outlined by Rachman 
and Lopatka (1986b) might be utilized. 
Although this study was not able to demonstrate 
differences in information processing among anxious 
individuals, the question of group differences remains. 
Additionally, new questions were raised, in particular, 
those pertaining to the presence of multiple anxieties 
in the general population. The results of this study 
highlight the need for a rigorous subject selection 
process, like that of McNeil et al. (1985, 1990). 
Establishing the independence of anxieties, as outlined 
by Rachman and Lopatka (1986b), might assist in 
identifying appropriate subjects. Additionally, as to 
free recall of script information, a more detailed 
analysis of response and stimulus propositions may 
reveal group or other differences. Finally, response 
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training, such as that described by Lang et al. (1983) 
may accentuate group differences. 
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History and Early Philosophy 
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The study of emotion has intrigued philosophers 
and scientists for centuries. Aristotle postulated 
that beliefs, bodily motions, and physiological changes 
constituted inextricable elements of emotions. 
Containing a rational and cognitive component, emotions 
were thought to be controllable reactions to external 
stimuli (Calhoun & Solomon, 1984). In this manner, 
Aristotle avoided explaining· mind-body dualism, which 
clouded many arguments about the nature of the 
"passions." 
As technology advanced, scientific theories 
replaced philosophical suppositions. Given the general 
zeitgeist towards rationality, it was not surprising 
that emotion would be a topic for scientification when 
psychology attempted to identify itself as a science. 
Wilhem Wundt successfully argued that scientific 
psychology was a discipline independent of philosophy, 
and in 1879, he founded the first formal psychology 
laboratory (Boring, 1957). 
Wundt's contribution to the study of emotion is 
twofold. First, he promulgated a tridimensional theory 
of feeling. The three axes which operated 
simultaneously and independently were: 
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a) pleasantness-unpleasantness, b) strain-relaxation, 
and c) excitation-calm (Boring, 1957). Secondly, he 
attempted to objectify the study of emotion, employing 
natural science paradigms (i.e., observation). Wundt 
believed that psychological processes could be observed 
and made the object of rigorous experimentation. He 
described the utility of introspection as follows: 
The experimental method is of cardinal 
importance; it and it alone makes a 
scientific introspection possible. For all 
accurate observation implies that the object 
of observation (in this case the psychial 
process) can be held fast by attention, and 
any changes that it undergoes attentively 
followed (Wundt, 1873, p. 249). 
While Wundt deserves commendation for promoting 
psychological experimentation and meticulously 
collecting tomes of historically interesting data, 
introspective methods proved insufficient to account 
for the subjective experience of emotion. 
James-Lange Theory of Emotion 
Recognizing the importance of scientific methods 
from German psychology, William James, who had been 
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directing his own laboratory at Harvard University 
since 1875, introduced experimentation to American 
academia. James is widely known for his theory of 
emotion. In 1884, William James endeavored to apply 
contemporary principles of neurology to the 
understanding of emotion. James believed that the 
central nervous system was a set of "Passions," which 
existed independently of consciousness. This theory 
was simultaneously developed by a Danish psychiatrist, 
C.G. Lange, and was subsequently referred to as the 
James-Lange theory of emotion. This new theory reduced 
affect to the perception of physiological disturbances 
which were caused originally by awareness of external 
events and objects in our environment. When an 
individual encountered emotional stimuli, the nervous 
system reacted automatically, producing adjustments 
primarily in the viscera and skeletal muscles. James 
claimed that "the bodily changes follow directly the 
perception of the exciting fact, and that our feelings 
of same changes as they occur is the emotion" (James, 
1884, p. 291). "We feel sorry because we cry, angry 
because we strike" (James, 1884, p. 292). The 
James-Lange theory is essentially a behavior theory of 
emotion, since awareness (i.e., affect) is dependent 
upon physiological, reflexive responses. 
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Several prominent flaws impeded the acceptance of 
the James-Lange theory. The assumption that the system 
acted "as a bundle of predispositions to react in 
particular ways upon the contact of particular features 
of the environment" (James, 1884, p. 292) was deficient 
in explaining emotional nuances. Moreover, the theory 
offered no means as to how to distinguish and identify 
emotions, which may present no discriminating 
physiological reactions. 
One critic of the James-Lange theory was Walter 
Cannon. A physiologist, Cannon argued that emotions 
might be correlated with visceral disturbance, but 
causality could not be inferred from the perception of 
these disturbances (Calhoun & Solomon, 1984). Cannon 
was able to call into question the James-Lange theory 
by surgically severing vagus nerves in dogs. While the 
animals were unable to detect bodily sensations, affect 
was still apparent (i.e., "happy" was inferred from a 
wagging tail, while "angry" or "fearful" was inferred 
from growling and ears held back). 
To that point, no one had successfully accounted 
for the experience of emotion; Wundt suggested a 
tridimensional model, but employed ineffective 
experimental techniques. James had only focused on 
physiological vicissitudes, ignoring cognition and 
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overt behavior. John Dewey proposed a more integrated 
view of emotion. He suggested that physiological 
disturbances and overt behaviors characterize emotion 
and are required to deal purposefully with the 
environment. The experience of emotion included a 
"quake" or feeling (e.g., sadness), purposeful 
behavior, and an object that had an emotional quality 
(Calhoun & Solomon, 1984). 
Recent Theories of Emotion 
Modern theories of emotion have borrowed ideas not 
only from neurology, but also from recently developed 
theories of information processing. The most widely 
accepted theory of information processing, and one 
which has been most readily applied to the study of 
emotion, is that of the propositional network. The 
propositional theories developed as an alternative to 
dual processing models which suggested that information 
retained in memory was stored as complete and 
nonreducible verbal memories and visual images. In 
these conceptualizations, sensory or motor experiences 
comprised memory. Empirical research, however, did not 
substantiate an iconic memory model. 
In the propositional theory, the smallest 
meaningful independent unit of knowledge is the 
proposition. Events are represented in approximal 
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form; meaning is paramount. Propositions are related 
in a network fashion, so infinite interconnections 
between concepts are possible. These connections 
create meaning, as each conception is defined by its 
relation with other concepts, or nodes. If an 
individual frequently encounters a stimulus along with 
another object or event, the two bits of information 
are stored together. The strength of the relationship 
increases with each encounter, even when the stimulus 
information is stored with more general concepts. The 
stronger the association, the more rapidly verification 
occurs. However, when facts about a stimulus are not 
directly encoded with that concept, information must be 
inferred each time, requiring processing time and 
energy. For example, if a child is bitten by a dog, 
the association that develops is the sensation of pain 
and anxiety with the perception of a dog. While the 
child may encounter nondangerous dogs, the child's 
first reaction is anxiety and the association of pain, 
since the retrieval of nonfrequently stored information 
("all dogs are not dangerous, this may be a friendly 
dog") requires more time. The consequence of this 
rapid and selective processing can be behavioral 
avoidance. 
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More recently, Peter Lang, in order to objectively 
study emotion, drew upon Anderson's (1980) work in 
propositional theory to account for cognition. Lang 
added a behavioral component, so that the expression 
and experience of emotion was a combination of verbal 
report, physiology, and behavioral responses. Lang 
proposed that emotion is comprised of these three 
systems and their interaction. Lang's view can be seen 
as a modification of the ideas James and Dewey 
originally put forth. 
Using anxiety as an example, verbal reports can 
include complaints of anxiety, dread, panic, and 
(frequently) concomitant complaints of worry, 
obsession, and insecurity. Secondly, visceral and 
somatic activation patterns are included, such as 
elevation of heart rate, muscle tension and blood 
pressure. Lastly, behavioral actions can also be 
present. One might expect to see escape, avoidance, 
hypervigilance, dysfunctional immobility, compulsive 
mannerisms, and deficits in attention and performance 
(Lang & Cuthbert, 1984). Each of these components are 
represented in an individual's propositional network. 
An individual may not equally express all three 
components (verbal report, physiological response, 
behavioral action) of the affective structure. One may 
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feel "nervous" inwardly prior to speaking to a group of 
colleagues, but appear calm. James (1884) earlier noted 
the discrepancy between verbal reports and overt 
behavior: "Even when no change of outward attitude is 
produced their (muscles') inward tension alters to suit 
each varying mood, and is felt as a difference of tone 
or strain" (p. 293). In addition to identifying the 
elements of the affective structure, one must examine 
how the activation of the structure creates or 
determines the experience of emotion. 
Additionally, the affective memory structure 
contains information pertaining to the following 
aspects: (a) stimuli which prompt activation of the 
network and the context in which the stimuli occur, (b) 
response action with respect to the context (expressive 
facial or verbal behaviors, overt approach/avoidance 
behavior or visceral and somatic activity which support 
or confirm action and attention), and (c) meaning of 
the stimulus and the response (Lang & Cuthbert, 1984}. 
During the processing of sensory information, 
reactions are evoked, depending upon the number of 
propositions which are accessed in the memory structure 
and the extent to which the internal stimuli from 
storage match external stimuli. A near-perfect match 
can be achieved between actual exposure and 
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propositional representation of an event. Degraded or 
approximal stimuli can elicit partial or full 
responses, more if other response or meaning 
propositions are also instigated. 
Lang and colleagues (Cook et al., 1988; McNeil et 
al., 1990) focused on the examination of anxiety as a 
relatively stable affective state. In terms of 
propositional representation, the anxiety-provoking 
object or event exists as a model or prototype in long 
term memory. Previously, anxiety had been 
conceptualized as a consistent internal state (a 
"lump") which preceded and motivated behavior. 
Currently, anxiety, as well as other affective 
states, is understood to be a disposition to approach 
or avoid. Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert (1990) have 
suggested that emotions are "action dispositions" (p. 
377); emotional behavior is said to be organized along 
an appetitive (approach)--aversive (avoidance) 
dimension. If this type of approach/avoid conflict is 
common, how then are persons who are anxious different 
in response from nonanxious individuals? Response to 
events which include presentation of stimuli which have 
some nearly-identical characteristics can be 
differentiated via the semantic meaning encoded with 
them. Differences in meaning are encoded in memory. 
For example, if someone encounters a bear, the 
physiological and overt behavioral patterns are quite 
different if the bear is confronted in the open 
wilderness versus in a zoological park. In the 
wilderness, the sight of a bear signifies danger; 
avoidance is appropriate; in captivity, bears do not 
typically represent eminent harm, but rather are 
creatures of curiosity. 
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In addition to differences in semantic encoding, 
individuals with pathological levels of anxiety seem to 
have memory structures with an excessive number of 
response propositions (physiological arousal, 
avoidance) which are highly resistant to modification 
(Foa & Kozak, 1986). The anxiety structure remains 
unmodified because it is coherent; this coherency may 
be due to distortion in the processing mechanism for 
anxiety-relevant information. The excessive response 
propositions encoded into the perceptual-motor memory 
of anxious subjects are important because they underlie 
overt behaviors. 
Foa and Kozak (1986) outlined several assumptions 
regarding the accessibility of the anxiety structures 
in memory. First, they regard the structure of an 
evoked memory as similar to the actual stimulus that 
elicits it. Secondly, the anxiety structure is not 
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always available for conscious processing. Thirdly, 
given the imperfect awareness of anxiety networks, 
nonintrospective methods of assessment are necessary. 
Physiological reactions represent reliable measures 
since anxiety involves a fight or flight response. 
Ideally, one would need to observe physiological and 
overt behavior in the presence of the anxiety-provoking 
object or event. However, this scenario is sometimes 
not available due to infeasibility in the laboratory 
setting. Therefore, the use of imagery is employed as 
a method of accessing the anxiety networks. 
Images 
In propositional networks, affective response 
elements are coded by stimulus, response, and meaning. 
These elements constitute a stable fear prototype (Lang 
et al., 1980; Lang et al., 1983). When this network is 
processed, motor subprograms which define an action set 
(based on previous behaviors) are activated. The 
prototype may be activated by nonlinguistic media 
prompts (e.g., slides, audiorecorded scripts) or by in 
vivo exposure. Lang (1977) proposed that images and 
actual exposure to a stimulus produce approximately 
identical neurophysiological responses. Therefore, 
images can substitute for objective events, not only in 
the laboratory, but also in therapeutic settings. For 
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example, systematic desensitization offers a viable 
therapeutic technique because "a basic assumption 
underlying this procedure is that the response to the 
imagined situation resembles that to the real 
situation" (Lang, 1977, p. 863). Again, this 
similarity is possible because "affective images are 
best conceptualized as propositional structures, rather 
than as raw, reperceived sensory representations" 
(Lang, 1977, p. 863). Images are not reducible, iconic 
elements. Moreover, images have attributional 
properties which cannot be detached from their 
objective contents. 
Propositional models of imagery are logical and 
parsimonious because images are not recalled exactly, 
but are recollected in an approximal manner. When a 
subject experiences an emotionally-laden image, the 
anxiety prototype stored in long term memory is 
accessed. The image essentially creates itself from 
the cognitive constructive process, "through which 
patterns of efference are regenerated, duplicating the 
response array of perceptual-motor and action memories" 
(Cook et al., 1988, p. 38). Therefore, the image is 
recreated as it is evoked, and propositions are added 
or subtracted with each evocation. Lang (1977) stated 
that the emotional image be considered as a cognitive 
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schema containing a finite set of propositional units, 
each of which can be represented as a verbal statement 
or instruction" (p. 867). 
If emotional images represent cognitive schema, 
then images which are pathologically frightening can be 
therapeutically altered. Inconsistent success reported 
in research on flooding and desensitization might be 
due to the variations in the vividness of the images 
evoked, and the subsequent modification of the 
cognitive schema. The effect may be dependent upon the 
completeness of the access to the propositional 
network. One way to gage the level of access is to 
measure how vividly the image is recreated. Since 
large visceral responses may be aversive to the 
individual, the subject may wish to avoid or 
discontinue the imagery experience, such that the 
cognitive schema remain unaltered (e.g., "all dogs are 
still dangerous"). Vividness, affective intensity, and 
the balance between stimulus and response elements all 
help to determine the therapeutic effect of imagery. 
In terms of images, the anxiety-provoking object exists 
as a template in long term memory. The subject's 
capacity to process images will determine the degree to 
which the memory is accessed (Cook et al., 1988). 
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As already noted, emotional imagery can be evoked 
by verbal instructions (e.g., scripts) or memory aids 
(e.g., slides). Lang et al. (1980) suggest the use of 
an action set in imagery instructions, since images are 
a finite information propositional structure in the 
brain which have the properties of a perceptual motor 
set. The subject can be instructed to imagine him or 
herself engaged in the image content "as if" it were 
really happening. Ideally, the image evokes a response 
similar to exposure of actual stimuli. Scripts, 
therefore, provide valid instructional cues to assist 
subjects in generating images. In this manner, for 
example, the fear network could be modified in a 
therapeutic setting, such that subsequent cognition and 
behavior are altered in an adaptive fashion. 
Conclusions 
Questions and speculation regarding the nature and 
experience of emotion have been addressed by offering 
alternative theoretical models and newly developed 
experimental techniques to study affect. Most 
theorists (e.g., Wundt, Lang) speculated that emotion 
was comprised of several components. Wundt proposed 
that emotion had three dimensions (i.e., 
pleasantness-unpleasantness, strain-relaxation, and 
excitation-calm). James focused exclusively on the 
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physiological manifestations of emotion. More 
recently, Lang outlined a theory which proposed that 
emotion was a combination of verbal reports, physiology 
and behavior. The individual experience of emotion is 
highly idiosyncratic, as affect is determined by 
elements in cognitive networks. These networks have 
information about stimuli, response and meaning, such 
that when an individual encounters relevant stimuli, a 
network (or networks) is activated, and the resulting 
combination of elements determines emotion. 
As theories of emotion were modified, the methods 
used to study affect also changed. Wundt employed 
paradigms of observation which were not adequate. 
Previous primitive attempts at objectifying emotion 
were disproven and fell out of favor with the 
prevailing zeitgeist. Recently, the examination of 
emotion has merged with cognition research and the 
burgeoning field of information processing. 
Researchers (e.g., Foa & Kozak, 1983; Lang, 1977, 1979, 
1985; Lang et al., 1983) are currently conceptualizing 
affect as a complicated cognitive network which has 
components of stimulus, response and meaning. Affect 
can be examined through imagery assessment procedures. 
The degree of network activation, and the concomitant 
experience of emotion, is inferred. In this manner, 
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theories are being empirically examined using 
sophisticated electronic, computerized equipment. The 
scientific community may have testable theories of 
emotion which can be disproven or accepted on the basis 
of research made possible by advances in psychological, 
physiological and computer science technologies. 
Appendix B 
Imagery and Relaxation Scripts 
Relaxation Script 
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Position yourself in the chair as comfortably as you 
can. Uncross your feet or legs if they are crossed and 
allow your eyes to close. Now, relax the muscles of 
your left forearm. Let your left forearm be limp, 
heavy, and calm. Let the relaxation spread to the 
muscles of your left arm. Let your let arm relax and be 
calm and warm. Relax the muscles of your right forearm. 
Let your right forearm be limp, heavy, and calm. Now, 
relax the muscles of your right arm. Let your right arm 
feel calm, warm and relaxed. Now relax the muscles of 
your left leg. Let your left leg feel heavy, calm, and 
relaxed. And now, also relax your right leg. Let the 
muscles of your right leo feel calm, warm, and relaxed. 
Now, relax the muscles near your stomach. Let the 
muscles near your stomach feel calm, warm, and relaxed. 
Now relax your forehead. Let your forehead muscles be 
calm and relaxed. Let this relaxation spread to the 
muscles of your neck and shoulders. Let your neck and 
shoulders feel calm, warm heavy, and relaxed. And now 
relax the muscles around your eyes. Let the muscles 
around your eyes be heavy, calm, and relaxed. Relax all 
the muscles of your body. Let your whole body be warm. 
Neutral Scripts 
1. Bus Stop 
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You are sitting at a bus stop on the corner of a quiet, 
tree-lined street. It is a bright summer day and birds 
are flitting among the tree branches. You feel 
peacefully at ease under the trees and the white, 
billowy clouds which drift slowly by in the blue sky. 
Across the street, a man in a brown shirt dozes on his 
patio, while a sprinker sprays sparkling droplets of 
water over his lawn. 
2. Living Room 
You are in your living room reading on a Sunday 
afternoon. Leaning back in your chair, relaxed, you 
look out of your window. It is a sunny autumn day. 
Red and brown leaves float slowly down from the trees. 
A yellow Volkswagen goes by in the street, scattering 
the blanket of leaves. A gentle breeze picks up a 
little spiral of leaves, which dances for a moment in 
the middle of the street before settling again on the 
ground. 
3. Lawn Chair 
You are sitting in a lawn chair on your porch on a 
summer afternoon. Leaning back, relaxed, you feel a 
soft warm breeze blowing across the porch. A green 
lawn stretches out before you, and scattered trees sway 
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gently with the wind. Comfortable and content, you are 
so relaxed your hardly move while you sit in the chair 
enjoy the pleasant summer day. 
Action Scripts 
1. Bicycle 
On a clear Saturday morning you are riding your bicycle 
on a quiet country road. You breathe and sweat runs 
down your face while you pedal rapidly over the road. 
Ahead of you is a steep hill, and you tense your face 
and neck muscles, working to climb the hill. Your eyes 
look to the right at several chickens which scatter 
when you pass a large red barn. A rooster crows loudly 
from within the barn. Your heart races as you near the 
top. 
2. Kite 
You breathe deeply as you run along the beach flying a 
kite. Your eyes trace its path as it whips up and down 
in spirals with the wind. You tense the muscle.in your 
forehead and around your eyes to block out the 
sunlight. ·You perspire freely in the warm sun. Your 
heart races while you run along the sand, leading the 
kite, whose long white tail dances beneath the soaring 
red diamond. 
Dental Anxiety Scripts 
1. Dental Examination 
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You are in a dentist's chair waiting for an 
examination. You glance around the room and notice a 
tray of needle-like instruments before you. You tense 
up as the piercing whine of a high-speed drill echoes 
into the room from across the hall. Sweat trickles 
from your armpits as your dentist comes in, washes, 
picks up a pointed, hooked probe, and moves it toward 
your jaw. Your heart races when the cold steel point 
scrapes against your teeth as the dentist probes for 
soft spots along the gumline and in the crevices on the 
tooth crowns. 
2. Dental Injection and Drilling 
You are fully reclined in a dental chair, head back, 
preparing to have a cavity filled. All of your muscles 
feel tight as you clutch the armrest of the chair. The 
dentist looms in front of you, holding a syring·e with a 
long, chrome needle and brings it toward your mouth. 
Your heart pounds as the sharp needle is slowly 
injected into your upper palate. Your eyes dart about 
the room during the injection and you see the 
technician preparing the drill. You gasp and then 
breathe rapidly. Perspiration seems to pour from your 
body as the needle is withdrawn. 
Snake Anxiety Scripts 
1. Boat 
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You are rowing a boat on the lake and your heart begins 
to pound when you see a long, poisonous-looking snake 
following closely at your stern. Your eyes follow its 
undulating motions with your eyes, as it sweeps back 
and forth in the water. As you row faster to get away 
from the snake, you breathe deeply, straining all your 
muscles to pull the boat away from the threatening 
serpent. You sweat h~avily from all the rowing and you 
cannot move the boat away from the snake. 
2. Field 
You are walking through a field on a sunny day, when 
you notice a snake, lying coiled and motionless, on a 
rock about five feet away. You stop, and your muscles 
stiffen. Your heart begins to pound. It is a medium 
sized brown snake, about three feet long. The snake 
flicks its tongue in an out, and you perspire freely. 
You take rapid, shallow breaths as the snake begins to 
move. You follow the movement of the snake as it 
slithers from the rock. 
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Social Anxiety Scripts 
1. Reprimand from Professor 
A few class meetings after turning a required term 
paper in an important class, your instructor asks you 
to remain in the lecture hall when the period is over. 
Anticipating some problem, you notice that your muscles 
are so tense that your hands are trembling. After your 
classmates have left, your professor, speaking harshly, 
expresses a great deal of disappointment in your work 
on the paper, and you can feel you heart throbbing. 
You begin to perspire freely when errors in grammar, 
punctuation, and logic are pointed out. You glance at 
the clock in the room as the professor continues 
criticizing the term paper. 
2. Speech to Class 
You have volunteered to give a presentation to a class 
in which you badly need to improve your grade. You 
have never addressed such a large group before. Your 
palms have become sweaty, and you tense up the muscles 
of your forehead. The hands of the clock inch forward, 
and your heart begins to race as the buzzer in the hall 
signals the start of class. As you walk to the front 
on the room, you breathe rapidly and glance around at 
the faces of the audience. The whole group looks at 
you in silence, shifting restlessly in their seats. 
Table 1 
Mean assessment scores for verbal report instruments 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Possible 
Instruments Range Focal 
a 
Snake Fear 0-30 12.2 
Questionnaire ( 7 . 2) 
(SNAQ) 
a 
Dental Fear 20-100 61.8 
Survey (DFS) (19.4) 
a 
Social 0-28 4.3 







( 4 . 2 ) 
b 
41.8 
( 9. 0 ) 
b 
16.8 





( 6 . 5 ) 
a 
60.5 
( 1 7 . 2 ) 
b 
17.7 








Note. Higher scores indicate report of c;~reater anxiety, 
except for the QMI, in which higher scores reflect 
poorer imagery ability. 
Note. Duncan's Multiple Range Tests were conducted 
subsequently to the ANOVAs. Individual instrument 
means that do not share a common superscript differ 
significantly at R < .05. 
Note. Scores reported are from the second 
administration of screening instruments (i.e., SNAQ, 
DFS, SADS). 
ltlt 
R < .0001 R < .01 
Table 2 
~ean values for free recall data 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Group Total Number 
of Scripts Recalleg 
Focal 9.0 
( 1 . 5) 
Social 8.8 
( 1. 2) 
Focal/ 8.7 
Social ( 1 . 9) 
75 
Total Number 
9f Words RecalleQ 
235.1 
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Figure i· Group Dominance Scores 





































a.ction den~.! ~nake sccia.l 
Script Contetit. 





4.0 ........... . 
neutr;.l ;..::tion dental snake socia.l 
~ Foc2l Group 
Script. Content 













12.0 ..... . 






4.0 ..... . 
neLttral 
%Focal C.roup 
action denh 1 ir.~.ke social 
S cl.-;JJ:- t. Co ti t.en t. 















neutr~.l action denh.l ~n=J<:~ ~ooi:.l 
S or i :pt. Con t.en t. 
IllS od a} Group ~/. :03 Foe a I Group 
VITA 
Jeri .L. Fritz 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis: AFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO IMAGERY: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
FOCAL AND SOCIAL ANXIETY 
Major Field: Psychology 
Speciality: Clinical 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Billings, Montana, August 1, 
1962, the daughter of Gerald and Patricia Fritz. 
Education: Graduated from Kelly Walsh High School, 
Casper, WY, in June 1980; received Associate of 
Arts Degree in Psychology from Casper Community 
College in May 1982; received Bachelor of Arts in 
Psychology from the University of Montana in May 
1984; received Master of Science Degree from 
Oklahoma State University in December 1985; 
completed requirements for Doctor of Philosophy at 
Oklahoma State University in December 1990. 
Professional Experience: Teaching Assistant, Department 
of Psychology, Oklahoma State University, August 
1984 to May 1986. Practicum Student, Family Mental 
Health Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma, August 1986 to July 
1987. Practicum Student, Payne County Guidance 
Center, Stillwater, Oklahoma, August 1987 to July 
1988. Psychology Intern, Veteran's Administration 
Medical Center, Gainesville, Florida, September 
1988 to August 1989. Employee Assistance Program 
Coordinator for Walt Disney World, Florida 
Psychiatric Associates, Orlando, Florida, September 
1989 to present. 
